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Introduction
The academic literature on terrorism was almost non-existent until the 1970s,
when the rise of violent secular leftist groups prompted a wave of new research on the
topic. Though the literature on terrorism and counterterrorism has developed dramatically
since them, certain areas remain largely unexplored. For example, despite estimates that
females comprise 30% of the world’s terrorists, scholarship on them remains extremely
limited.
My research attempts to address this gap in our understanding by focusing
specifically on one dynamic of female terrorism: integration. I hypothesize that certain
key “dimensions” act as unifiers that increase the likelihood that females will be
integrated into secular terrorist groups. I maintain that the more unified a terrorist
organization’s membership is, the more likely it is to incorporate females into its ranks.
Dimension One is a “Unifying Objective.” I argue that when a terrorist group’s
objective is “gender-transcendent” and can be applied to both males and females, it
unifies the group. Dimension Two is a “Shared Enemy.” Here I suggest that when a
group’s enemy is readily identifiable and generally agreed upon, it fosters group unity.
Dimension Three is a “Homogeneous Identity,” the assumption being that the more core
identities group members share (e.g., nationality, culture, language, ethnicity), the more
unified they will be.
My first hypothesis is that levels of unity will vary across three different types of
secular terrorist groups: Ethno-Nationalist, National Liberation and Revolutionary.1 My
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I only focus on secular terrorist groups based on the assumption that they differ in
important ways (especially regarding views of women) from religiously motivated
groups.
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second hypothesis is that these different levels of unity will in turn result in different
levels of female integration, with more unified groups integrating females at a higher rate
than less unified ones.
I expect Ethno-Nationalist terrorist groups to show the highest level of unity and
thus to integrate females the most. Their common objective to establish an ethnic
‘homeland,’ shared enemy (those who are not of their ethnicity), and collective identity
(of culture, ethnicity, language and often religion), should make them the most “unified”
of the secular terrorist groups.
I expect National Liberation terrorist groups will integrate females at fairly high
levels, but not as high as Ethno-Nationalist terrorist groups. National Liberation
movements share a gender-transcendent objective of independence, and can identify a
clear enemy (the colonial metropole), but its identity may not be as homogeneous as the
Ethno-Nationalists since the country being ‘liberated’ may encompass varying cultures
and peoples.
Finally, I expect that Revolutionary groups will integrate females at the lowest
rate because of their relative lack of unity. While such groups identify “revolution” as
their objective, individual definitions of what that entails will probably vary based on sex,
economic status, and political standing, and thus may not necessarily be gendertranscendent. For revolutionary groups, “the enemy” can mean different things for
different parts of its membership based on a plethora of things, and may create division.
Further, I believe that because the identity of revolutionary groups is inherently less
homogenous, it will be the least unified group.
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Reliable, comprehensive data on terrorism is simply not readily available, as
Forsburg points out: “…looking solely at state- and group-level factors [of terrorism],
purely quantitative work is scarce.”2 This lack of available data considered, I use a blend
of qualitative and available quantitative data to determine levels of female integration
within each type of terrorist group.
I begin my research with a review of the literature that addresses the importance
of female terrorism scholarship and identifies the main areas of focus on the topic.
Following that, I provide an expanded explanation of my ‘unifying dimensions’ and
present three case studies from each of the three types of terrorist groups, identifying
their makeup and reviewing the literature about each type’s proneness to female
integration. Data analysis is then conducted to test my hypotheses. Finally, I discuss my
research findings and highlight areas of terrorism scholarship that require more research.
Literature Review
Why Study Female Terrorists?
Harmon estimates that 30% of today’s international terrorists are female.3 Yet
despite the significant presence of women in politically violent groups, Witlox notes a
“systematic underestimation of the new danger of the female terrorist.”4 Though recent
years have seen an upsurge in research on the topic, Jacques and Taylor note that “the
range of foci and disparate events covered within literature suggests an absence of both
strong theory and tests of that theory.”5 In addition to this lack of theory building, a

Ole J. Forsburg, Ethnonational Terrorism: An Empirical Theory of Indicators at State Level, 1985 – 2000,
WISC Conference (Turkey), August 2005, 1.
3
Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today (London: Frank Cash, 2000), p. 212.
4
Maartje Witlox, What Motivates Female Suicide Terrorists, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, Social Cosmos, 40.
5
Karen Jacques & Paul J. Taylor, Female Terrorism: A Review, Terrorism and Political Violence, 21:3
(2009), 499.
2
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reliance on outdated or engendered conceptualizations threatens to undermine the
analysis of female terrorism.6 Jacques and Taylor also point out that: “despite the value of
description, most existing studies of female-perpetrated terrorism comprises discursive
reviews or case studies that do not test prevailing explanations for female involvement.” 7
Nonetheless, scholarship on female terrorists shows signs of improvement, with
potential for both academic and practical benefits. In terms of research, enhancing our
understanding of female terrorists will contribute significantly to the broader literature on
terrorism and political violence. At a practical or policy level, Nacos notes that “gender
reality [informs] the measures designed to prevent and respond to terrorism and perhaps
more importantly, the implementation of anti- and counterterrorism policies.”8
The topic seems likely to attract even greater attention from both researchers and
policy makers because as Katharina Van Knop points out, “female terrorism is increasing
because women are motivated to engage in political violence and organizations are facing
stronger incentives to recruit female operatives.”9 Farhana Ali suggests that this upward
trend in female terrorist involvement began in 2000 and will in all likelihood continue
going forward.10 Given this trend, scholarship focused on how, why, and to what degree
females come to be integrated into terrorist organizations becomes critical.
Research on Female Terrorists

6

Jacques & Taylor, 511.
Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Myths and Realities of Female-Perpetuated Terrorism,” Law and
Human Behavior 2013, Vol. 37, No. 1, 35.
88
Brigitte L. Nacos (2005) The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in
the News Coverage in Politics and in Terrorisms. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28.5, 448.
9
Katharina Von Knop (2007) The Female Jihad: al-Qaeda’s Women, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
399.
10
Farhana Ali, Rocking the Cradle to Rocking the World: The Role of Muslim Female Fighters, Journal of
International Women’s Studies, Issue 1, Vol. 8, Nov. 2006, 23.
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In a 2009 overview of female terrorism, Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor
identified seven research foci that dominate the literature on the subject: 1) Historical
Overviews, 2) Perception, 3) Feminism/Gender Studies, 4) Motivation, 5) Recruitment,
6) Roles, and 7) Environmental Enablers. Because the emphasis of my thesis is on the
integration of female terrorists into groups as operatives and leaders, I highlight the four
foci most relevant to my research.
Perception
Literature on female terrorists is effected in part by what Naaman calls “academic
feminist discourse in the West” that impacts how they are perceived.11 Two factors in
particular that have significantly shaped perceptions of female terrorists: Gendered
Stereotypes and Media Portrayal.
Gendered Stereotypes
Stereotypes shaped by societal assumptions about females have directly affected
scholarship on their role as combatants in politically violent groups. Davis argues that
this is because females, in general, “are perceived as victims of violence rather than
perpetrators.”12 Nacos suggests that when scholars create conceptual profiles of a
‘typical’ terrorist, more often than not “females just don’t fit.”13 Naaman asserts that
females have been systematically dismissed as terrorist perpetrators because such a
viewpoint “directly challenges the dichotomy of females as victims and males as

11

Dorit Naaman, Brides of Palestine/Angels of Death: Media, Gender, and Performance in the Case of the
Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers, Signs, Vol. 32, No. 4, War & Terror I: Race-Gendered Logics &
Effects in the Conflict Zones, 90.
12
Davis, 2.
13
Nacos, 436.
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defenders.”14 As a result, females have been prescribed to fit one of two depictions in the
media that make them digestible to society. The first depiction, as described by Dan
Berkowitz, is that of a “warrior” who is “beautiful, sexy, smart, and deadly.” 15 Here, the
focus shifts from the female’s action(s) to her physicality. The second representation of
the female terrorist is one who is “masculinized,” affirming the stereotype that males are
more violence-prone. Nacos notes that the idea that females “are not ‘real women’ tends
to be expressed especially in the context of the mother who choses political violence over
her own children.16
Media Portrayal
The news and popular media has also significantly shaped perceptions of female
terrorists by presenting sexualized imagery of them. Physically, the media casts female
terrorists as the “sexy warriors” described by Berkowitz. In her examination of female
terrorist portrayal, Nacos remarks that “if one takes the news at face value, female
terrorists are always good looking, trim, and pleasant.” 17
Perceptions of female terrorists are also affected by the personal narratives
created by the media about them. Whereas the personal lives of male terrorists are rarely
a focal point in reports of political violence, accounts of female terrorists often include
riveting, romanticized narratives designed to invoke sympathy. Media outlets provide
information about the age, socioeconomic status, education level, and family of the

14

Naaman, 935.
Dan Berkowitz, “Suicide Bombers as Women Warriors: Making News through Mythical Archetypes,”
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 82, No. 3 (2005): 607–622.
16
Nacos, 445.
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Nacos, 439.
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female terrorist to create audience empathy, something rarely if ever done in the case of
male terrorists.
In both literature and the news media, the female terrorist is regularly presented as
hapless, lovelorn individuals driven to violence more by emotion than practicality. This
“framing” is so strong that when females who have voluntarily chosen to be terrorists are
identified, they are frequently dismissed as “defective” or anomalistic. The implicit
assumption is that no “normal” female would ever deliberately engage in herself in the
“masculine” world of terrorism unless she was incited by some emotional trigger or male
influence.18
Motivation & Recruitment
A significant amount of scholarship on female terrorism focuses on the
motivation of women who engage in political violence. Though there is ample literature
addressing the varying tactics terrorist groups have used to recruit females, Jacques and
Taylor note that little is understood about the interaction between individual motivation
to join on the one hand and group recruitment on the other.19 In terms of the former, the
literature has identified five frequently observed motivational factors.
Motive One: Gender Equality
According to Nacos, “contemporary news still explains the motives of female
terrorists as the expression of gender equality or the struggle to achieve gender equality
quite frequently.”20 While not all female may find gender equality upon joining a terrorist
group, Von Knop lays out the premises of this argument at length:

18

Von Knop, 410.
Jacques & Taylor, 507.
20
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Terrorist attacks occur in the public realm from which women are otherwise
excluded. Female terrorists are thus able to pursue opportunities other than the
limited ones available in traditional societies. This suggests that female
subordination is linked to female participation in terrorism. As agents of violence,
women are no longer defined according to their gendered roles. In this case
participation in terrorism is a means through which women can pursue a
misinterpreted understanding of female liberation or emancipation. As a result of
the absence of other role models the radical women do believe gender equality
means being as violent as their male counterparts are.21
Motive Two: Reclamation of Honor/Purpose
Another motivation for females to join terrorist organizations considers cultural
concepts of womanhood within particular societies. First, Von Knop suggests that many
females “are driven to terrorism by a desire to regain their personal or family honor.” 22 In
incidents where females have lost their virtue through rape or infertility, their society may
no longer consider them a female. Second, Van Knop suggests that “as a result of
marginalization, women may seek refuge in a terrorist organization. These groups offer a
double benefit to these women by accepting them when they no longer have options in
mainstream society, and allowing them to regain their honor by committing a terrorist
act.”23
Motive Three: Alignment with Group Objectives
Females also join terrorist organizations simply because, like males, their beliefs
align with the group’s ideology and/or doctrines. According to Christine Sixta, “terrorist
[females] want social reform to preserve their own cultures and religions from the
invading and increasingly intrusive Western culture…they want to keep their culture

21

Van Knop, 400.
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intact.”24 Martin points out that for terrorists, regardless of sex, “a major cultural
determinant of terrorism is the perception of “outsiders” and anticipation of their threat to
a group or culture’s survival.”25 This identified motivation for females to join terrorist
groups proves that all motivation is specific to sex.
Motive Four: Personal Influence
Personal experiences can motivate both males and females to join terrorist groups.
These experiences can be identified as a specific key event or an individual who inspires
or influences a terrorist to become involved in the group’s cause. There is literature that
suggests that some personal influences can be sex-specific, while other influences are
unisexual.
Cunningham, for example, notes that females’ recruitment and engagement in
terrorist organizations is directly tied to a male influence who inspired them to do so.26
Fink, et al., argue that “like some of their male counterparts, women can be influenced or
coerced to participate in terrorism by male family members.”27 Fersch notes that “female
terrorists are frequently motivated by personal reasons, such as revenge or key life events
that affected the woman personally.”28 Sage also makes the case that “for a woman to
become a terrorist, something truly extraordinary must have occurred… [and] this

Christine Sixta (2008), The Illusive Third Wave: Are Female Terrorists the New “New Women” in
Developing Societies?, Journal of Women, Politics and Policy 29.2, 262.
25
Gus Martin, Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies, 2 nd Ed., Ch 3. “Causes of Terrorist
Violence,” (Sage Publications: 2011), 51.
26
Karla J. Cunningham, Countering Female Terrorism, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2007, 115.
27
Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Rafia Bakarat, Liat Shetret, “The Role of Women in Terrorism, Conflict, and
Violent Extremism: Lessons for the United Nations and International Actors, Global Center on Cooperative
Security Policy Brief April 2013, 3.
28
Ellsworth Lapham Fersch, Thinking about Insanity, Religion, and Terrorism: Answers to Frequently
Asked Questions with Case Examples, (iUniverse: 2010), E-Book.
24
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occurrence is best understood as a ‘personal” experience.’”29 Matthew Dearing suggests,
for example, that “[p]sychological responses to traumatic events, such as rape or death in
the family, can have a powerful impact on a woman’s choice to end her life by [joining] a
suicide mission.”30
Scholars points out however, that the personal motivation for some to join
terrorist groups is not always sex-specific. Fink, et al., for example, point out that:
“Some of the same factors that prompt men to become terrorists drive women in
the same way: grievance about socio-political conditions; grief about the death of
a loved one; real or perceived humiliation on a personal, physical, psychological
or political level; a fanatical commitment to a religious or ideological belief or
beliefs; an intention to derive economic benefits; [or] a desire to effect radical
changes.”31
Jacques and Taylor note that key events terrorists’ lives “may provide possible
motivation for suicide terrorism [that arise] out of an individual’s psychological response
to events and circumstances that were beyond their control.”32 They also note that the
death of a loved one, humiliation, and/or exploitation” can motivate individuals,
regardless of sex. 33 Victor notes degradation or humiliation at the hands of the ‘enemy’”
as catalyzing “traumas that underpin the motivation to act.”34 When “compounded [by]

29

Liz Sage, The Impossible Terrorist: Women, Violence, and the Disavowal of Female Agency in
Terrorism Discourses, Women, Violence, and Disavowal of Female Agency in Terrorism Discourses, Liz
Sage JPCS Vol. 4, No. 1, 2013, 60
30
Dearing, Matthew P. “Like Red Tulips at Springtime: Understanding the Absence of Female
Martyrs in Afghanistan.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 33, No. 12, (2010), 1082.
31
Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Rafia Bakarat, Liat Shetret, “The Role of Women in Terrorism, Conflict, and
Violent Extremism: Lessons for the United Nations and International Actors, Global Center on Cooperative
Security Policy Brief April 2013, 3.
32
Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different
Reasons?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (4), 2008, 7.
33
Jacques and Taylor, Different Sexes, Different Reasons?, 7.
34
Barbara Victor, Army of Roses. (London: Constable & Robinson) 2006.
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difficult living conditions,” Jacques and Taylor suggest that key events for females can
act as “turning point[s]” that incite them to participate in political violence. 35
Roles
The emphasis of this thesis focuses on the integration of females into terrorists
groups within specific roles. Jacques and Taylor note that there are five basic “roles”
scholars use to classify female terrorists: 1) Sympathizers, 2) Spies, 3) Warriors, 4)
Leaders, and 5) Suicide Bombers.36 For the purpose of my research, my focus is on two
of these roles: Warriors and Leaders.
Cunningham notes that “in the past, [female terrorists] seldom went beyond such
activities as gun-running, harboring fugitives, fund-raising and intelligence — activities
that oiled the terrorist machine and enabled it to operate smoothly, but kept women at a
remove from violence. Now many are no longer content to sit on the sidelines.”37 Moving
from the sidelines in this context means assuming positions as either combatants
(‘Warriors’) or leaders.
Not only are females becoming more integrated into terrorist groups, but my
thesis argues that they are attaining more leadership roles. I now examine the literature on
the two types of female terrorist roles.
Warriors/Operatives
Literature focusing on the varying roles of female terrorists considers a female
operative (or perpetrator) to be one who participates directly in acts of political violence.

35

Jacques and Taylor, Different Sexes, Different Reasons?, 7.
Jacques & Taylor, 507.
37
Karla Cunningham, Invisible Women, Los Angeles Times, April 4, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/04/opinion/la-oe-cunningham-women-jihadists-20120404.
36
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Hearne notes that they are particularly used to replenish membership in times of need by
joining the ranks themselves or by providing ‘jihad wombs’.38
Literature may highlight the various methods through which females may
perpetrate violence, but a substantial focus is placed on suicide bombers as a common
exemplar. Raghavan and Balasubramanivam note that many terrorist groups began using
females for “frontline duties” and suicide bombings beginning in the late 1990s and early
2000s.39 They note that many groups have particularly utilized females in suicide
bombing and frontline fighting with direct impact,40 but point out that “nationalist groups
were the main benefactor[s] of them.”41
Hearne points out that “the role of female terrorists has evolved into something
more active, perhaps ‘tougher, more fanatical, more loyal’, than previously seen…[and
that] female members of violent extremist groups now engage directly in attacks,
including suicide bombings, attracting widespread disbelief and heightened media
interest.”42
Leaders
Fink, et al., note that “women can be powerful preventers and participants in
innovative efforts to inform, shape, and implement policies and programs to mitigate the
efforts of conflict and violent radicalization.”43 Further, Jacques and Taylor’s literature
review provides data noting the frequency in which terrorist groups employ women as

38

Hearne, 5.
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40
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both “warriors,” and “leaders.” Their findings suggest that leftist organizations tend to
utilize females as “warriors” and “warrior leaders” more than religious groups. 44 They
also find that females “are not active as warrior leaders without also being active as
warriors” as well.45
Tom O’Connor notes the ratio of male to female-led terrorist operations in the late
20th century (80% and 20%, respectively).46 Cragin and Daly suggest that female
leadership in terrorist groups is on the upsurge because females are[becoming essential to
modern terrorist movements as they “galvanize” them.47
Scholars offer several possible avenues through which female terrorist ascend to
positions of leadership. O’Connor proposes the following: 48
1. “The Outsider-Savior:” a female leader that comes to power at first as a
healer after major catastrophe or group set back and “represents a
platform of healing and renewal.”
2. “The Warrior-Defender:” a female leader with military experience and
expertise in security or international affairs that make her more
comfortable for the membership to accept.
3.

“The Legacy:” a female leader that O’Connor suggests is the most
common. These are the widows, daughters, and wives of a revered male
leader within the group who often assume leadership by default.

4. “The Party Leader:” a female leader who has brought political success
to the group through fundraising, lobbying, and/or public relations that
further its objectives.
Literature related to female terrorist leaders frequently focuses on popularized
figures, such as Ulrike Meinhof of Germany’s Red Army Faction, Leila Khaled of the

44
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PLO, and Fusako Shigenobu of the Japanese Red Army. While narrative is important in
understanding female terrorists, my research does not focus on specific individuals, but
rather the degree to which females generally achieve leadership roles in terrorist groups.
Methodology
The central focus of my research questions if there is a linkage between a group’s
unity and likeliness of integrating females. As noted above, measuring levels of
integration quantitatively—by simply counting the membership of different terrorist
groups—is not possible as the information necessary is not available. Instead, I estimate
female membership (and integration) in terrorist groups using descriptive and qualitative
research.
The term “terrorism” is a highly contested term as scholars have not yet agreed on
one definition or even how to differentiate ‘terrorism’ from ‘political violence.’ As
Forsburg rather crudely notes, “creating a universally-accepted definition for terrorism…
is not simple. In fact, it may merely be an exercise in intellectual onanism.”49 I use the
term ‘terrorism’ instead of ‘political violence’ in my research simply because it is the
more commonly used terminology in the literature. Specifically, I adopt the United States
Department of State’s definition (Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f (d)) of
terrorism: “[terrorism is] premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience.”50

49

Forsburg, 3.
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I identify three “dimensions” with which I determine a terrorist group’s unity;
here, I present the literature that informed my choice of these dimensions in particular.
Unifying Objective
I argue that in order for a terrorist group to be unified (and thus, integrate
females), it must have an objective or set of objectives that are equally distinct and
unifying. This objective is the foundation of the group’s structure. The literature about
terrorist groups’ makeup suggests that a central shared objective is critical to ensuring
success and longevity.
To be clear, I subscribe to Enders and Su’s definition of a “shared objective,”
which notes that an objective can center around several things including but limited to
“the elimination of a grievance stemming from income inequality, ideological
differences, historical inequities, or a lack of political, economic, or religious freedom.” 51
My belief that this is an important predictor in determining a group’s unity is
substantiated. As I determine groups’ level of unity in my research, I will first identify
their objectives and examine how cohesive they are.
Scholars note the importance of a unifying objective for terrorist groups, and also
note the dangers of not having one. Fallon and Henkes note that a “lack of clear direction
can cause [group] members to interpret network goals differently. In some instances it
can provide disproportionate power to less mainstream members.”52 Using Al-Qaeda as a
model, Dishman notes that as groups have decentralized and lost their unifying

Walter Enders and Xuejuan Su, “Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure, Journal of Conflict
Resolution February 2007, Volume 51, No. 1, 36.
52
Rob Fallon & Matthew Henkes, “Understanding Terrorist Networks: Asymmetric Responses to
Weaknesses in the Network Structure,” Journal of Scholarship and Ideas, Spring 2007, 26.
51
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figurehead, they have subsequently lost their shared goals and overall unity. 53 Other
scholars also maintain that when a terrorist group does not have a shared objective,
opportunists will create their own that compete and fragment the group, leading to
independent factions.54
Shared Enemy
The second dimension I use to determine how unified a terrorist group is concerns
the presence of a shared enemy that is as easy to rally against. I believe that “ingroupoutgroup”55 biases increase group unity. Caruso points out that a group’s objectives and
enemies are directly linked as “the goal of the organization naturally determines who they
perceive as the enemy and the group they want to maintain loyalty to.”56 Evrigenis argues
that in most groups—terrorist or not—it is undeniable that a common enemy is critical
for sustainment.57
Increasingly, literature on terrorism acknowledges that groups are uniting with
others because of a common enemy. Fraser notes evidence that affirms an increase in
alliances, saying “many of these groups have a common enemy, and there is increasing
evidence that they are beginning to form larger-organized, better-financed organizations
in an effort to conduct terrorism against a common enemy.”58 Klein and Pritchard affirm
that “an external enemy presenting a perceived threat…within a group presents an
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excellent rallying point for uniting a group.”59 My belief in the importance of a shared
enemy to maintain group unity is directly substantiated by Ferrante, who states that “an
external enemy gives a group singular direction, thereby increasing its internal
cohesiveness.”60
Homogeneous Identity
The most difficult dimension in my measurement of group unity is in a measure
of its group Homogeneity. According to Crenshaw, “Acts of terrorism are committed by
groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs.”61 Uschan speaks
specifically about the foundation of separatists groups, noting that “a nation is usually
based on shared characteristics, bringing together a population that speaks the same
language or belong to the same ethnic group.”62 Stout specifically points out the
importance of a cultural Homogeneity within a terrorist group to foment support, saying:
Suicide missions by some terrorist groups in the Middle East provide a vivid case
in point…The overwhelming cultural message is that immolating oneself to
destroy other lives is not only acceptable but highly desirable. An entire cultural
structure consisting of family, friends, schools, teachers, religious institutions,
press, and political establishment shares and propagates a strong belief system
concerning martyrdom for the cause.63
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Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism
Background
In 2005, Ackham and Asal noted that “despite the fact that much of recent terror
is ethno-nationally based, little attention has been paid to systematically explaining ethnic
violence.”64 Currently the literature addressing ethno-nationalist terrorism does so in a
way that makes any inclusive supposition about them difficult. Rudolph defines ethnonationalist groups as those who “perceive to share a common (national) identity, different
from that of other nationalities in the countries.”65 In defining ethno-nationalists,
Forsburg argues that they are “regionally concentrated peoples, with a history of
organized political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or regional
government, who have supported political movements for autonomy...”66 Vamik Volkan
maintains that they “link their ethnic identity with the necessity to form a nation, that is,
to gain access to political autonomy within established borders.67 In discussing their
construction, objective, and ideology, Lefebvre states:
Ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups believe, however, that terrorism is a
very effective means to get rid of the dominant ethnic group and/or achieve the
specific form of political autonomy they so desire. To achieve repeated success,
however, they depend on the logistical assistance of governments, organizations
or individuals supporting their cause, as well as on the sympathy of their
brethren.68
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Further contestation over definitions of concepts like a ‘nation,’ and are
complicated by observations like Nielsen’s, who maintains that “all nationalisms are
cultural, but not all cultural nationalisms are ethnic.”69 Despite the broad array of ways to
define ethno-national terrorism, literature agrees on several points in characterizing these
types of terrorist groups. Though Ted Gurr describes the true origin of ethno-nationalist
conflict as a “chicken-and-egg”70 issue because of their diversity,71 most scholarship
places the rise of ethno-national terrorism in the 1960s and 1970s, during eras of
colonialism and neo-colonialism.72 Further, Hoffman notes that beginning from 1968 to
1978, the number of active ethno-nationalist groups increased notably, from three to
thirty.73
The factors that motivate and sustain ethno-nationalist groups also vary, but have
some commonalities. Forsburg points out that the elements that most affect ethnonationalist movements are 1) cohesiveness of a national identity, 2) financial
differentiation within the state, 3) “openness” of the state.”74 In his research, he brings up
two theories explaining their motive. Competition Theory sees ethnic conflict arising
from competition over scarce resources. Segregation Theory, in contrast, argues that
conflict occurs when ethnic groups segregate from one another.75 Counterintuitively, a
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number of scholars maintain that n minority ethno-nationalist group does not have to be
societally “disadvantaged” to necessarily motivate a desire for separation. 76
To relate this to my research question, I note that the literature suggests ethnonationalist terrorists’ success is partially tied to clear objective unity. Hoffman states that
“Ethno-nationalist groups have clear goals… [they] can rely on their brethren for support
[and] appeal to a collective tradition to sustain and replenish.”77 Jalata affirms that ethnonationalist movements legitimize themselves by relying “on the grievances of a collective
memory to regain economic, political and cultural rights [and] by rejecting subordination
and cultural assimilation.”78 Volkan describes such groups as rallying against a dominant
ethnic group, which is seen “as an occupying, opposing, colonizing or foreign force.” 79
While scholars agree that Ethno-Nationalist terrorist groups were most active in
the 1960s and 1970s, most agree with Lefebvre’s assertion that “we are far from seeing
the disappearance of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups.”80 Inequalities and past
wrongs that are simply too resilient in the minds of most minorities and states who fail to
devise effective grievance management and settlement strategies are cited as two
essential reasons ethno-nationalists groups will persist.81
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The next section of my research examines three terrorist groups categorized as
Ethno-Nationalist. I first provide a brief overview of their history and formation,
followied by a discussion of their tactics, and then a review of their history of female
integration.
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
The first ethno-nationalist group that I examine is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka became independent in 1948. As is the norm in
recently-decolonized countries, the departure of the colonizer left a power vacuum that
several forces immediately vied for; almost immediately after independence, conflict
arose between the Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus. DeVotta states that within the
first decade of Sri Lankan dependence, Sinhalese Buddhist politicians belonging to the
United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) worked to guarantee
that their community would receive preferential treatment in all institutions comprising
the Sri Lankan state—(Parliament, judiciary, security forces, public education, and the
bureaucracy). This produced significant displacement and marginalized the Tamil
Buddhist minority.82
The LTTE was established in 1976 in response to this perceived marginalization
of the Tamil Hindu minority. Here I note that the group’s stated and shared objective was
to create a separate and independent Tamil Hindu state in the Northern and Northeastern
part of Sri Lanka that would allow them equality and fair representation of themselves.
The shared enemies of the LTTE were the Sinhalese-dominated UNP and SLFP, and
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include any leaders within either group. Further, I would argue that because the LTTE’s
objective and operations concerned the country of Sri Lanka, its participants’ identity was
extremely homogeneous. Tamils were tied together by bonds of language, ethnicity and
nationalism as well as by their Hindu religious identity.
Though the LTTE was ultimately defeated in 2010, its temporary success in
achieving a separate Tamil state is noteworthy. DeVotta notes that at its height (mid1990s to 2006), the LTTE controlled approximately one quarter of Sri Lanka. 83 It
achieved this using a variety of terrorist tactics including hijackings, bombings, etc.
Notably, the LTTE remains the only terrorist organization to have assassinated two world
leaders: former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (May 1991) and Sri Lankan
President Ranasinghe Premadasa (May 1993).84 Data from the Global Terrorism
Database suggests that from 1976 to 2010, the LTTE carried out 1,665 attacks.85
It took the LTTE approximately twelve years to integrate female participants into
its operations.86 This integration was at first likely a response to the Sri Lankan
government’s crackdown on males suspected of LTTE involvement during the 1980s.87
As the pool of available Tamil males dried up, females were brought in to replace them.
Female participation in the LTTE became so substantial that in 1986, the group created
an all-female unit known as the Freedom Birds.88 Research conducted by Stack
O’Connor credits these Free Birds with close to 200 suicide bombings, and suggests that
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they accounted for 30-40% of the LTTE’s total suicide attacks.89 The group became so
reliant on its female participants that it eventually allowed them to hold press
conferences, publish literature and films, and hold public commemorative events on the
group’s behalf.90 The LTTE’s evident integration of females into every dynamic of their
operation coupled with its clear unity affirms my hypothesis.
Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK)
Van Knop claims that females are responsible for one third of the LTTE’s suicide
bombings; but the numbers are even more impressive in the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê
(PKK), with females being responsible for two thirds of all attacks.91 The PKK is an
ethno-nationalist group whose key objective has been to create an independent Kurdish
homeland from territory inside Turkey.92
The Kurds have had a place in what is today Turkey since the sixteenth century,
when political negotiations with both the Ottoman and Safavid Empires allowed them to
settle in the area in exchange for guarding its borders.93
But during the early twentieth century rule of Atatürk and his drive to modernize
Turkey, McDowall says the Kurds lost their place, and “could not be [Turkish] citizens in
the fullest sense.”94 By the late 1970s, The Turkish government had begun to implement
patently anti-Kurdish legislation. Laws that made speaking Kurdish punishable by up to
twenty years of iin prison along with similarly draconian laws ultimately led to the
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founding of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, in 1978.95 Over time, the group has
become especially distinctive for its clan-based hierarchy that includes tribes, sub-tribes,
and tribal confederations, which leads some observers to describe the group
heterogeneous.96
The PKK has utilized a number of tactics in its armed struggle for an independent
state. Between 1996 and 1999, the PKK officially claimed responsibility for six “belt
bomb” attacks resulting in 15 casualties.97Attacks typically targeted landowners and their
families.98
The PKK’s utilization of females in its operations is notable. Data from the
Chicago Project in Security suggests that between 1996 and 1999, females participated in
eight attacks that killed 18 people and injured 109.99
Discussion of the unity of the PKK is complicated by questions of unity within
the Kurds as a whole. Some scholars suggest that key events have divided the PKK,
including the ideological shift of the group’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, from MarxismLeninism to “democratic federalism” in 1999.100 Further, the creation of the Koma
Civakên Kurdistan (KCK)—an umbrella organization encompassing Kurds from multiple
states—was also perceived as potentially divisive for Kurdish separatist efforts.
McDowall points out that “[a] natural assumption about the Kurds, since they speak a
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separate language, is that they are ethnically different from their [neighbors]. The reality
is more complicated.”101
The PKK’s scope may extend outside a single state, but scholarship on the Kurds
suggests that the language, ethnicity, and shared Muslim religion of the Turks override
those geographical differences. I would argue that this unity is the reason for the group’s
especially high level of female integration.
The Chechen Separatist Movement
In my final ethno-nationalist case study, I examine the Chechen separatist
movement in Russia. Following the USSR’s dissolution in 1991, efforts were made by
the divided Chechen Ingush ASSR to create an independent Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria. Two Chechen Wars ensued (The First Chechen War from 1994 to 1996 and The
Second Chechen War from 1999 to 2009) with substantial Chechen separatist causalities.
Since 2000, Chechen terrorists have been responsible for 61 attacks resulting in
645 casualties.102 Chechens have relied heavily on belt bombs, but also utilized car
bombs.
The role of females in the Chechen separatist movement was initially limited as
societal and cultural restrictions prevented female participation or mobility.103 But
Cunningham maintains that since 2002, Chechens have increasingly utilized female in
operation especially as suicide bombers.104 Davis argues that growing numbers of women
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are participating in radical Islam through a nationalist frame, citing Chechnya as an
example.105
Like the LTTE, the females of the Chechen separatist movement have become so
distinct that they have earned a separate name, and are sometimes known as “Black
Widows.” The label is not an official one, as with the LTTE Freedom Birds, nor is their
linkage to the broader movement. Some Chechen separatist leaders have disaffiliated
themselves from the Black Widows while others openly claim them.106 Nonetheless, the
number of Chechen separatist attacks attributed to females is considerable. Data from the
Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism records a total of 24 Chechen separatist
attacks that involved female operatives in the last 15 years, resulting in 343 casualties.107
Chechen separatists and the Black Widows within the movement are considered
highly unified. They share a Chechen nationality and language, consider themselves
ethnically Chechen, and unite under the religion of Islam. The notable and increasing
presence of the Black Widows within the movement appears to support my argument that
there is a link between unity and female integration.
National Liberation Terrorist Groups
Background
The second type of group I examine, National Liberation groups, differ from
Ethno-Nationalist ones essentially because of their objectives. While an EthnoNationalist group very clearly seeks to separate from a state, a National Liberation group
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seeks liberation from its colonial metropole. Muir argues that these groups see liberation
as the most legitimate vehicle to achieve political self-rule.108 Sanchez-Cueca states:
Nationalist terrorism aspires to independence or greater autonomy for some
territory. The combination of territorial claims and armed struggle gives rise to a
very definite strategy, violence intended to coerce the State. Nationalist terrorist
organizations kill repeatedly with the aim of breaking the will of the State. 109
Crenshaw cites the 1970s and early 1980s the heyday of national liberation
terrorism and points out that it was usually employed by leftist groups.110 While these
groups have not totally disappeared, their prominence in terrorism has been eclipsed by
radical religious organizations of the later twentieth and early twenty-first century.
The tactics utilized by national liberation terrorists are not necessarily distinct
from other terrorist groups, but their success in achieving their objectives is notable. A
significant number of countries, particularly in Africa, owe their independence to the
campaigns of national liberation organizations.
My hypothesis predicts that nationalist liberation terrorist groups will be highly
united, and as a result integrate females more than more divided groups. In keeping with
my three listed dimensions, I note that nationalist liberation groups have a shared
objective directly impacted by a shared enemy (namely, independence from a metropole).
On the question of a shared identity, however, I argue that national liberation terrorist
groups are less homogeneous than ethno-nationalist groups. Identities such as religion,
ethnicity, and language may not be shared by all in the group, and because of this
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diversity, I expect national liberation terrorist groups to be less unified and therefore less
likely to integrate females than ethno-nationalist groups.
Case Studies
The following section examines terrorist groups categorized as Nationalist
Liberation organizations. Incidentally, the three groups I examine are groups from the
continent of Africa, whose nationalist movements were all prompted by the post-colonial
wave the followed World War I: 1) The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, 2) The Mau
Mau Movement, and 3) The Mozambique Liberation Front.
The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)
The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) emerged in the context of antiimperialist sentiment towards Ethiopia. Prior to Ethiopian rule, Eritrea had been
colonized by Italy in 1890, and subsequently been passed around to other European
powers during the 20th Century.111 Zondi and Rejouis argue that this pattern of shifting
foreign control for the better part of sixty years catalyzed the nationalist sentiments that
eventually ignited Eritrean desires to break from Ethiopia.112 These sentiments came to a
head in 1952, when Great Britain gave Eritrea back to Ethiopia under the condition that it
be considered part of a “federation” with its own partial autonomy. 113 Ethiopia’s thenemperor Haile Selasse ignored the Britain’s instructions and immediately declared Eritrea
a “province” of Ethiopia without any autonomy, provoking outrage in the Eritrean
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population. 114 In 1960, the first anti-colonial armed group, the Eritrean Liberation Front
(ELF) was established, from which the EPLF emerged later as a breakaway faction.115
In evaluating their objectives, Zewde notes that throughout their efforts, “the
EPLF saw self-determination as a colonial question leading to independence rather than a
national question resolvable with a democratic united and poly-ethnic Ethiopia.”116 The
EPLF ultimately prevailed in May 1991, when Eritrea successfully seceded from
Ethiopia.117 In 1993, Eritrea was officially declared an independent state.118
Literature on the EPLF highlights both the role of females in its operations and
the impact of gender equalizing objectives. Zerai notes that females were first able to join
EPLF operations in 1973.119 Says Sorenson: “accounts of the Eritrean struggle for
independence agree that women played a major role at all levels within the movement
…[which] considered the improvement of the women’s situation an indispensable part of
its democratic goal.”120 Bernal suggests that the EPLF represented a model of a new kind
of nationalism built from the bottom up by women and men together.121 She maintains
that while other social movements integrated females in supporting roles, the EPLF
specifically and deliberately integrated females into its ranks as fighters alongside the
group’s men. “EPLF fighters appeared to transcend gender, men and women performed
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the same tasks and lived communally as comrades in mixed units.”122 Scholars note that
female’s integration into the EPLF was so thorough that once its main objective—
liberation—was achieved—many female combatants felt displaced and unsure of how to
reintegrate back into civilian life.123
Iyob states that by 1988, the EPLF had developed into “a conventional army
utilizing tanks and other weaponry captured from Ethiopian garrisons.” 124 Connell notes
that EPLF tactics were specifically designed to force the [Ethiopian] government to
commit larger forces to defensive positions across Eritrea and thus raise doubts about the
effectiveness of the state as a whole.125 Marcus describes the EPLF’s tactics as “low-level
warfare” designed to “sap” the morale of the government garrisons through hit-and-run
operations that wore Ethiopia into submission.126
Members of the EPLF shared a common objective: liberation from Ethiopia and
the creation of a politically autonomous state. The group identified a shared enemy in
Ethiopia. Yet, like many national liberation movements, Eritrea was not united by a
common identity that could further bind them. Eritreans speak several languages
including English, Tigrinya, Amharic, and Arabic.127 Contrary to the predictions of my
hypothesis, though, this lack of unity did not reduce the level of female integration by the
EPLF. Their special attention to gender equality as a core part of the group’s objective
indicates that females were extremely integrated. In other words, this national liberation
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group features the same level of unity and female integration as an ethno-nationalist
group.
The Mau Mau Movement of Kenya
National liberation movements against the European powers in Africa during the
mid-twentieth century erupted across the continent in a domino effect. One of the most
prominent of the movements manifested in Kenya, the place of my second nationalist
liberation case study, through the Mau Mau Movement.128
Britain’s colonial rule in Kenya had, like Italian control in Eritrea, begun in the
1890s and steadily intensified.129 Principally among the Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest single
ethnic group (though only accounting for about 20% of the country’s population130), antiBritish sentiment came to a head with the creation of the Mau Mau militant movement in
the 1950s. According to Curtis, among many Kikuyu grievances, “land ownership was
the clearest example of inequity and exploitation,” and likely what finally sparked the
movement to action.131 By October 1952, Britain had declared a state of emergency in
what most scholars agree was a thinly-veiled declaration of war against Kenya’s
rebels.132
Branch states that the Mau Mau Movement promised to deliver “freedom, land
and every good thing [Kenyans] wished to have” and as a result quickly gained popular
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support.133 The shared ‘enemy’ of the movement was very pointedly the British at first,
but later expanded to include Kenyans who sympathized with the British, known as
“Loyalists.” This shared objective and enemy in the Mau Mau movement are not unique
to Kenya, but were common among other decolonization efforts throughout Africa.
Females certainly played a central role in the Mau Mau effort, though initial
perceptions of them were highly shaped by British media of the era. J.T. Kamunchulah
specifically suggests in his research a connection between Kenyan women’s activism and
prostitution, arguing that the Mau Mau Movement’s success is largely attributable to a
complicated “network of communication facilitated by prostitutes who laid ‘tender traps’
to seduce and subsequently assassinate British soldiers and Kenyan loyalists.134
Early literature on Kenyan females of the Mau Mau Movement marginalizes their
participation. According to Presley, this preconception comes from scholars’ failure to
acknowledge the colonialist laws that negatively impacted—and thus, galvanized—
Kenyan females just as much as Kenyan males.135 Clough asserts that female
participation in the movement steadily increased throughout its duration.136
Once females were integrated into the Mau Mau organization, their roles do not
appear to have been limited. Corsfield states that females of the Mau Mau movement
held every type of responsibility, including the organization and maintenance of the
supply lines directing food, supplies, medicine, guns, and information to the forest forces,
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recruitment, and officiating at initiation ceremonies.137 Presley adds that their service
extended into battle as well, as females regularly joined the forest forces and served as
combat troops.138
Female integration in the Mau Mau movement is one of the easiest to evaluate
thanks to extensive records kept by the British during the rebellion. A report cited by
Presley from the Kenya Colony Protectorate indicates that a total of 52, 685 females were
imprisoned for Mau Mau movement-related crimes 1952 to 1958.139
Much like other contemporaneous national liberation movements across the
continent, the Mau Mau’s tactics were what Peacock calls “textbook guerilla,” he
describes the problems British forces had in combatting them, saying:
The Mau Mau would use children or women to spy on British garrisons and
destroyed infrastructure in order create distractions to draw out the military and
police. Once sympathizers had informed fighters about the departure of the
military, the Mau Mau would attack the garrison headquarters and steal weapons
or intelligence left in the building. The guerrillas gave the British and Kenyan
loyalists just enough to follow them back into the forests, where they had set up a
series of rudimentary traps such as spike pits or falling logs to cripple armored
elements and corral infantry into a disadvantageous terrain where they could be
attacked without risking much. These tactics bled out the British military in the
region and infuriated the Colonial government, who were convinced that the Mau
Mau would be beaten within a few months.140
Kenya’s Mau Mau Movement represents a national liberation attempt that
ultimately failed, but has interesting implications in regards to my research questions.
The Mau Mau Movement’s “foremost” goal was to propagate Kenyan unity against the
British, but internal division affected its objectives constantly. 141 Literature notes
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significant division between Kenyans who supported the Mau Mau Movement and those
who sympathized with the British. These Loyalists, predominantly wealthy and usually
Christian, condemned the movement’s supporters, according to Branch, “for their
apparent refusal to labor virtuously and their failure to obtain land, freedom or selfmastery.142 I suggest that this disunity—which worsened in the years following Kenya’s
independence and eventually led to civil war—directly impacted the Mau Mau
Movement’s level of female integration.
Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)
The last national-liberation group I examine is the Frente de Libertação de
Moçambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique. The roots of its establishment began in 1932,
when António de Oliveira Salazar took power in Portugal and introduced O Estado Novo
(The New State), an ideological agenda that encouraged the tightening of bonds between
Portugal and its colonies, including Mozambique.143 One method used to foster this
bonding was the encouragement of increased white migration to Mozambique. The best
amenities, jobs and land were, of course, reserved exclusively for whites and prohibited
to Africans, who had already been placed in a second class status among the Europeans.
Sumich and Honwana assert that “Africans were systematically starved of resources to
build amenities for whites and ensure a relatively high standard of living for Portuguese
migrants.”144 In 1962, FRELIMO was established and began to send its members to
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Algeria for training in preparation for the launch of its luta armada (armed campaign) in
September 1964.145
The overarching objective of FRELIMO was to liberate from Portugal. However,
like the Mau Mau Movement, FRELIMO members’ motivations to liberate varied
depending on socioeconomic status. The urban proletariat class, for example, faced a
direct danger from the onslaught of Portuguese settlers who threatened their jobs and
livelihood. Meanwhile, the class identified by Sumich and Honwana as “colonially elite”
Africans (known as the assimilados or “the assimilated”) had become alienated during
Salazar’s New State transition and now found themselves without power and motivated
to remove the Europeans who had usurped it.146
One way in which FRELIMO stood apart from most other national liberation
movements was its willingness to deploy particularly young female in combat. West
notes that girls as young as ten directly participated in guerrilla operations.147 It was
similar to other such movements, though, in that female integration was limited at first,
with females usually acting supportive roles. By 1966, though, Munslow notes that the
recruitment and arming of females in FRELIMO was so substantial that male elders and
other authority figures began complaining that “girls with guns slung over their shoulders
presented an unacceptable challenge to ‘traditional’ social relations.”148 Despite such
protests, leaders of FRELIMO continued utilizing females in all operational areas. West
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notes that by 1970, female participation in FRELIMO’s armed campaigns had become
“institutionalized”.149
Scholars note that FRELIMO made significant efforts to create and maintain a
membership that was thoroughly unified. Accordinf to Sumich and Honwana, the group
tried to unify itself by creating within it an egalitarian a society that promoted
cohesion.150 West points out that the leadership of FRELIMO also worked to include
gender equality as a subset of its overarching campaign against “oppression and
exploitation” to address the concerns of its female members.151
Despite its attempts at unity, however, FRELIMO’s divisions are evident.
Because the personal motivation of its membership was so impacted by socio-economic
status, it is difficult to claim that FRELIMO was “unified” by a common objective.
Scholarship acknowledges the group’s efforts to promote a homogeneous identity
through egalitarianism, but socio-economic differences were never entirely dismantled,
even within the niche. It appear the only true commonality members had was in their
shared enemy: Portugal. My hypothesis predicts that this disunity would result in less
female integration in FRELIMO’s operations.
Revolutionary Terrorist Groups
Background
Revolution is defined as “the usually violent attempt by many people to end the
rule of one government and start a new one.”152 Though in simple terms, revolutionary
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groups could be described as ones that seek to overthrow an incumbent regime and
replace it with a new one, there is still much debate over specific definitions. When it
comes to tactics, Post defines revolutionary terrorism as “acts perpetrated by groups
seeking to overthrow the capitalist economic and social order.”153 Celmer argues that
revolutionary groups use violence as a means of initiating a cycle of terror that both
alienates support for the state and catalyzes political revolution or change.154
The cliché that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is
especially prevalent in discussion of revolutionary terrorism and is indicative of the
“muddiness” surrounding the concept. Such confusion notwithstanding, scholars tend to
agree that revolutionary terrorism has decreased over the last 40 years. Jerrold Post notes
that revolutionary groups have declined in direct parallel to the collapse of European
communism the end of the Cold War.155 Pumphrey points out that revolutionary terrorists
have been in short demand since the late 70s.”156 F For the purposes of my research, I
define a revolutionary terrorist group as one that uses violence in an effort to attain
political control of the state.
Scholarship on revolutionary terrorist groups distinguishes them from other types
of violence movements by noting that their goal is not to separate from a state, but to
usurp it, George Pumphrey points out that “this form of terrorism should not to be
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confused with the national liberation struggles,157 while Price argues that “revolutionary
terror must be set apart from other insurgent violence.”158
Scholars maintain that the objectives of revolutionary terrorist groups rely
heavily on unity. Thackrah states that revolutionary terrorism has the limited goal of
forcing a state to change its policy on some issue, warning or punishing public officials,
or retaliating against government actions seen as reprehensible by the terrorists. 159 Martin
suggests that many revolutionary campaigns entail a process; for example, the overthrow
of an inadequate government followed by the establishment of a new government.160
Regardless of how many objectives a revolutionary terrorist group may have, public
support—(or at least neutrality)—is critical to success.
Like ethno-nationalist and national liberation group terrorist groups, revolutionary
terrorists are bound by a shared enemy: the state they are trying to overthrow. Horgan and
Taylor argue that revolutionary terrorist groups form most commonly because of either
shared ideology or shared enemies.161 Scholars use varying examples in history to point
out the importance of a shared enemy in revolutionary terror. In discussing the French
Revolution, for example, Arendt points out that the common unifying interest was a
common enemy (the Aristocracy).162
Levels of homogeneity within revolutionary terrorist groups have varied widely.
In the aforementioned French Revolution for example, the group was extremely
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homogeneous. In more recent cases, language, ethnicity, religion, and even nationality
have not necessarily acted to bind revolutionary groups. In fact one could argue that a
group identity is not even always necessary for such groups to achieve their objective(s).
Of the three types of terrorist groups I examine, my hypothesis suggests that
revolutionary groups are least unified and therefore least prone to integrate females. The
revolutionary group may share an enemy in that they are trying to overthrow a state or
government and replace it with one of their own, unifying it in that regard. Yet even as
group objectives may be shared, I argue that group identity may not be sufficiently
homogeneous to produce unity.
Case Studies
The next section of my research examine three terrorist groups categorized as
Revolutionary. Like the former case studies, I provide a brief history of their formation
and subsequently discuss their history of female integration.
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
The tumultuous period in Colombia known as “La Violencia”163 served as the
backdrop for the creation of several small guerilla groups with communist-based
ideologies seeking to carry out a revolution on behalf of the Colombian people,
particularly, the poor. One of these guerilla groups, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de
Colombia (FARC) is the first revolutionary terrorist group I examine.
There is some debate about when FARC was officially established, but most
researchers place the group’s origin in 1964. In that year, the Colombian government sent
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troops to quell “communist republics” that had been forming amidst the political chaos of
the latter years of La Violencia.164 Aided by the United States, the Colombian
government attacked these ‘republics’ in the remote mountainous region of Tolima where
they operated and dismantled most of them, though not before a number of militants had
escaped. By 1966, one group of escapees had created the entity now known as the
FARC.165
FARC’s membership and scope of operations expanded substantially for the next
twenty years. Rabassa and Chalk’s estimate that by the 1980s, the group encompassed
approximately 3,600 members in more than 32 fronts across Colombia.166 The group’s
revolutionary dynamic heightened especially, however, in 1982 when its leadership met
for their 7th Conference and outlined plans that would grant them the kind of political
recognition typically reserved for governments. Within the conference, leaders outlined
an eight-year plan culminating in the overthrow of the Colombian government, a plan
they believed would be supported by the Colombian people.167
The early 1990s was marked by expanding membership (reaching up to 10,000
mid-decade)168 and a surplus of revenue derived from various criminal activities,
including kidnapping and drug-trafficking. Even while enjoying such success, however,
the group suffered a number of serious setbacks. First, some argue that the death of
FARC leader Jacobo Arenas in 1990 led to a certain moral decay, with the group
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becoming significantly more involved in the drug trade, which was perceived as less of a
“People’s” cause.169 Then in 1991, a sweeping reform of the Colombian constitution was
adopted following a broad-based and inclusive constituent assembly, seriously
undermining FARC’s argument that the presiding government did not care about its
people.170
By the 2000s, increased military aid from the United States combined with the
formation of paramilitary groups like the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), or
“United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia,” quelled FARC’s efforts significantly. 171 By
the mid-2000s, countless attacks on government officials and civilians had changed the
Colombian public’s perception of FARC from that of revolutionaries to terrorists and
eroded popular support. Though greatly weakened, the FARC persists, with attacks on
Colombian solders being carried as recently as April 2015.172 Research suggests that as
the Colombian government received higher levels of foreign aid and international
support, its tolerance of the FARC dropped sharply. Currently, the FARC is in the midst
of negotiations with the Colombian government to disband as an armed force, indicating
that it is unlike to ever achieve its original revolutionary objective.
The National Counterterrorism Center lists a variety of FARC tactics including
“bombings, murder, mortar attacks, kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking, as well as
guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, and
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economic targets.”173 Though FARC’s power may have decreased within the last
decade,174 its violent impact is still evident. One database of FARC attacks indicates that
the group has carried out 578 attacks between 2006 and 2011 with 817 recorded
casualties.175
There has been notable female participation in FARC since its founding, but it
has not been without problems. While Stanski credits FARC’s more ﬂexible and gender
considerate ideology for an increase in its female participation,176 there have also been
accusations of abuse against women in the ranks, especially concerning reproductive
rights. Says Stanksi:
In many ways, the inclusion of women in FARC is predicated on intervening in
women’s biological capacity for re-production, either through forced
contraceptives and abortions. Control-ling pregnancies within the movement
allows FARC leaders to maintain some control over the actions and decisions of
their ﬁghters.177
According to Drost, females still comprised approximately 30-35% of FARC
membership in 2011,178 so recruitment efforts and utilization does not show signs of
decreasing despite the controversies.
Members of FARC shares one easily identifiable objective. According to Stanski:
The FARC’s leaders explain their early struggle as a revolutionary effort on
behalf of all marginalized Colombians….the group’s goal of self-preservation and
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land reform, as embodied by the independent republics, [has] evolved into a
broader political strategy to capture state power.179
FARC’s key enemy has been the Colombian government it has been trying to
overthrow for 50 years, but disputes with other guerilla movements have at times diverted
focus. As drug trafficking business increased in the 1990s, political objectives have in
some cases been subordinated to criminal profit motives. The FARC is a hierarchical
organization, but it is made up of sometimes competing regional subcommands, which
lends itself to potential division and disunity. Coupled with the group’s likelihood to
disband in the near future, I would argue that high female integration will remain highly
unlikely for the FARC.
The Brigette Rosse (Red Brigade) of Italy
Europe’s turbulent political climate in the wake of de-Stalinization in the Soviet
Union, student radicalization, and social discontent was the backdrop for the formation of
a plethora of ultra-leftist groups throughout the 1960s. One of these groups, the Brigate
Rosse or Red Brigade (commonly referred to as BR), remains one of Italy’s “most
dominant and violent extremist organizations the country…since World War II,” 180 and
serves as my second revolutionary case study.
Unlike some revolutionary terrorist organizations whose origins are murky, the
birth of the Red Brigade is well-established. The group was formed on October 20, 1970
by three radical University students (Renato Curcio, Margherita Cagol and Alberto
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Franceschini).181 It is notable that in contrast to the previously discussed groups, one of
the group’s founders (Cagol) was female.
The BR’s stated objective called for “the creation of a revolutionary state through
the use of armed struggle in order to create a split between the Italian Government and
other Western Alliances.”182 The group spent a significant part of its early years affirming
an ideology and tactical plan utilized societal frustrations towards a clear target: the
Italian government. Della Porta points out that the Red Brigade’s Marxist-Leninist
ideology became more prevalent as documents surfaced indicating that, “the working
class [was] the revolutionary subject, and the capitalist system [was] the enemy.” 183
One of the Red Brigade’s most critical moments occurred in 1975, when its
official manifesto, Resolution of Strategic Defense (RSD) not only outlined newer and
clearer group objectives and goals, but also its tactics and enemies. The document stated
that the group’s key goal was to “…strike against the heart of the State because the
[S]tate [was] an imperialist collection of multinational corporations.”184 Non-state groups
like the Italian Democratic Christian Party were also identified as enemies and subjected
to a skyrocketing number of attacks.185 It became apparent that the RSD worked as a
unifying document “solidifying the group’s reasoning for targeting local police and legal
authorities in an effort to enhance their terror operations in the urban areas.”186
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While publication of the RSD spelled out clear goals for both BR members and
potential recruits, adoption of the new tactics did not always produce positive results.
Sundquist suggests that as its attacks became more violent, the Red Brigade increasingly
alienated those who had previously sympathized their “people’s cause” and thus began
losing substantial public support.187
Of the groups examined thus far, the Red Brigades appears the least unified.
Despite the RSD’s efforts to establish a clear, unifying objective, the group’s membership
became steadily more divided. Divisions became so notable by 1977, that the
organization broke apart into two factions: the First Position (Prima Posizione) and the
Second Position (Seconda Posizione); with the former proving to be much more
violent.188
The Red Brigades remained a threatening presence in Italy from the 1980s
through the 2000s. Its dissolution ultimately resulted from decreased support for its cause
as its tactics became even more violent and it began targeting figures that most Italians
viewed with respect. In particular, the BR’s 1978 kidnapping and murder of the popular
former Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, produced a severe public backlash against the
group.189 By 2003, intensified counterterrorism efforts by Italian security forces had
resulted in the capture and extrajudicial killing of several key leaders of the group’s New
Brigade, effectively ending its terrorist run.190
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Many scholars argue that the level of female involvement in ultra-leftist
movements of the 1960s was in part a product of the overlapping feminist movement that
left a number of females open to more extremist tactics to achieve the equality they
desired. According to Jamieson:
Although women had fought alongside men as partisans in the Second World War
and assumed an increasingly important role in the workplace, trade unions, and
political formations, the law discriminated heavily against them and in favor of
men. Women were essentially defined by their roles as daughters, wives, and
mothers.191
Eager points out that many women in the Red Brigade had been previously active
in the in the Italian feminist movements of the 1960s, but had moved to political violence
because they felt such movements were “too constricting.”192 Research indicates that
from 1970 to 1984, females comprised one fourth of all left-wing terrorists in Italy (there
were other such groups besides the BR).193 Elsewhere, Jamieson estimates that between
1969 and 1989, 945 females were investigated for left-wing terrorist crimes in Italy out of
a total of 4,087 individuals (23.1%).194 Not only were females integrated into the Red
Brigades organization, according to former members, they were treated as equals. 195 This
gender equality likely owes much to the fact that females held leadership positions within
the group from its earliest days.
The Red Brigades of Italy stood out among its ultra-leftist peers in Europe in
terms of its spectacular violence and longevity. In its first 10 years, the group is noted to
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have carried out approximately 14,000 attacks.196 It was also notable for the high level of
overall integration and leadership roles that females maintained in the group. In spite
varying attempts to unify under objectives outlined in the RSD without success, the
presence of a common language, nationality, ethnicity, and religion created a partial unity
that I would argue facilitated female integration.
The Red Army Faction
Like the Red Brigades, the last group I examine gained notoriety for its violence,
its female integration, and most notably its informal female leadership: the Rote Armee
Fraktion or Red Army Faction. Under the banner of “[dismantling] the international
systems of imperialism and capitalism... in order for a Marxist-Leninist revolution to take
place,”197 the RAF wreaked havoc on Germany for nearly 30 years beginning in the
1970s. Arguably, it owes a substantial amount of its success to its female participants.
The sentiments that inspired the RAF and similar extremist groups emerged in the
Leftist movements of the 1960s. Young German students, radicalized by the wave of
leftist activism during the era, became increasingly alienated from the post-war system.
According to Murphy, “the younger generation challenged the older generation to ‘face
up to the past’…pointing to many ex-Nazis that were in government and business.”198 As
Germany’s political climate became more confrontational, members of this “young
generation” asserted their allegiance to the socialist cause and claimed to represent the
people against the old ‘imperialist’ establishment. Student protests increased in size and
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frequency during the 1960s. One such protest in 1967 culminated in the death Benno
Ohnesorg, a 27-year old student participating in his first demonstration who was shot by
a plainclothes policeman. Ohnesorg’s killing sparked a massive public outcry and marked
a turning point within the student movement.199 Stefanik describes the event as “a
psychological turning point for many future RAF members.”200 By 1970, Andreas
Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Horst Mahler, and Ulrike Meinhof had founded the RAF.
According to Stefanik, the group “fervently believed that the world’s problems
stemmed from a shared power structure that privileged the political and business elite,
and neglected the working masses,” and could be defeated by a Marxist-Leninist
revolution that they would lead.201 Beckler states that the RAF were “self-appointed
champions and leaders of the German ‘people’ in an armed revolution which they hoped
to have launched with acts of terrorism.”202 The group sought an armed revolution against
a shared enemy, the German government, and pursued this objective for almost thirty
years until it disbanded in 1998. Though it staged fewer attacks than the aforementioned
revolutionary groups, the RAF enjoyed extensive media exposure because those attacks,
featuring arson, armed robbery, kidnapping and murder, were ‘high profile.’203
Similar to the Red Brigades, female integration was present from the point of
inception. Ulrike Meinhof, in particular, was critical to the group’s efforts in its early
years. Indeed the RAF was actually called the “Baader-Meinhof Gang” by German media
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in homage to her and the group’s co-founder Andreas Baader.204 In evaluating possible
reasons the media emphasized Meinhof, Stefanik notes:
The press selected Ulrike Meinhof [because she] was well-known in West
Germany as both the editor-in-chief and contributor of Konkret,205 [and] the token
female on talk shows. Though some may have perceived [her] presence on
political commentary shows as fulfilling an unwritten gender quota, she was
articulate, well-educated and even provocative at times. Her academic
achievements were laudable and she was also a mother and wife. At least to
outsider admirers, she balanced career and family and represented a new kind of
German woman.206
Despite having her name prominently attached to the group, most researchers
maintain that Meinhof was never actually a leader of the RAF, but instead more of an
ideologue and propagandist. As Stefanik and others note, she capitalized on her
journalistic reputation from working on Konkret to propagate the RAF’s message and
attract recruits. Early on, she formed a budding friendship with RAF co-founder Gudrun
Ensslin, the female militant who had firebombed a German department store alongside
Andreas Baader in April 1968.207 Female participation in the RAF is seen throughout its
operations, most notably in a 1975 attack extensively covered by media in which five
RAF members led by female operative Hanna Krabbe stormed the German embassy in
Sweden, took eight hostages, detonated explosives and ultimately killed two diplomats in
April 1975.208
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The RAF was notable among other violent European left-wing groups for the
number and prominence of female members. The group maintained a shared objective,
enemy, and homogeneous identity that facilitated significant female representation at
every level of its operations. According to Gonzalez-Perez, there is a general consensus
among scholars that 33% of RAF’s membership were female.209 There is contention,
however, on what roles females actually filled within the group. Russell and Miller, for
example, assert that 60% of the RAF’s leadership was female.210 Merkl dismisses this
estimate, but maintains that females “were at least as likely as men to have attained
leading positions” in the RAF.211 Still, Weinberg and Eubank state that “women who
carried out attacks or served as leaders [in RAF] were exceedingly rare.” 212
Data Analysis
My data analysis examines each of the aforementioned groups and uses a mixture
of quantitative and qualitative data—obtained from several terrorist group databases—to
determine how “unified” a group is based on the criteria described above. Subsequently, I
use those results to examine if there is a correlation between terrorist group unity and
female integration.
How Unified is Each Type of Terrorist Group?
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As noted earlier, I use three dimensions to determine whether or not a terrorist
group is considered “unified:” 1) Shared Objective, 2) Shared Enemy, 3) Homogeneous
Identity. I recognize the ambiguity of my third dimension, and therefore limit its scope to
four dynamics: Language (L), Ethnicity (E), Religion (R), and Nationality (N). Based on
the qualitative data collected, I assign each group a score ranging from 1 (Lowest) to 3
(Highest) that indicates its level of unity. Once calculated, I provide a mean score that
indicates how unified each type of terrorist group is.
ETHNO-NATIONALIST GROUPS
LTTE
Shared Objective
x
Shared Enemy
x
Homogeneous Identity (L,E,R,N)
x
PKK
Shared Objective
x
Shared Enemy
x
Homogeneous Identity ( E, R)
Black Widows/Chechen Separatists
Shared Objective
x
Shared Enemy
x
Homogeneous Identity (L,E,R,N)
x
MEAN SCORE: 2.6

SCORE

3
SCORE

2
SCORE

3

Research on the LTTE indicates that it shared a highly unifying objective, enemy,
and identity, resulting in their score of 3. While the PKK shared an objective and enemy,
as the group expanded its geographic scope beyond Turkey, it sacrificed a part of
homogeneous identity, resulting in its score of 2. Like the LTTE, the Chechen separatists
(Black Widows) shared an objective, enemy, and identity. As a whole, Ethno-Nationalist
terrorist groups had a mean unity score of 2.6, indicating that they are a highly unified
type of group.
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NATIONAL LIBERATION GROUPS
EPLF
Shared Objective
x
Shared Enemy
x
Homogeneous Identity (L,E,R,N)
Mau Mau
Shared Objective
Shared Enemy
x
Homogeneous Identity (E,N)
x
FRELIMO
Shared Objective
Shared Enemy
x
Homogeneous Identity (L,E,R,N)
x
MEAN SCORE : 2

SCORE

2
SCORE

2
SCORE

2

Research on the ELPF suggested that the group shared an objective and enemy,
but was comprised of a membership too ethnically diverse to share a strong identity; thus,
the group received a score of 2. In the Mau Mau Movement of Kenya, group members
shared an objective and enemy, but its identity was fractured by the presence of Loyalists
who sympathized with the British; thus, the group received a score of 2. Lastly,
FRELIMO group members shared an objective and enemy, but internal socio-economic
divisions prevented the group from establishing a truly homogeneous identity; thus it
received a score of 2 as well. As a whole, National Liberation groups had a mean score of
2, indicating that they are moderately unified.
Though some of the FARC’s objectives have changed over time, its overarching
goal of revolution against the shared enemy of the Colombian government has remained
consistent throughout. Despite a bureaucratic group structure comprised of subcommands
and blocs, the group has maintained an identity that remains relatively unified. FARC
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earned a score of 3. The Red Brigades attempted to establish a common group objective,
but were unsuccessful. Nonetheless, the group shared a common enemy and identity,
therefore, they received a score 2. Finally, the RAF shared a strong common identity,
identified a shared enemy, and was able to persist for almost 30 years because they
shared an objective; they received a score of 3. On average, Revolutionary groups
received a score of 2.6, indicating that they are highly unified.

REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS
Group Name: FARC
Shared Objective
x
Shared Enemy
x
Homogeneous Identity
x
Group Name: Red Brigades
Shared Objective
Shared Enemy
x
Homogeneous Identity
x
Group Name: RAF
Shared Objective
x
Shared Enemy
x
Homogeneous Identity
x
MEAN SCORE: 2.6

SCORE

3
SCORE

2
SCORE

3

My hypothesis posited that Ethno-Nationalist terrorist groups would be the most
unified, National-Liberation groups would be slightly less unified, and the Revolutionary
groups would be least unified. In fact, both Ethno-Nationalist and Revolutionary terrorist
groups demonstrated relatively high levels of unity based on the measurements I used;
both scored an average of 2.6 on my scale. National-Liberation groups, meanwhile,
scored lowest with an average of 2. It’s important point out, though, that this score still
placed them in the ‘moderately’ unified category.
Female Integration
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Examining levels of female integration within each type of terrorist group I selected is
substantially more difficult to measure than group unity due to an absence of
comprehensive quantitative data on female membership. In Table One and Chart One
below I use qualitative data collected from the literature on each group to assess how
integrated females are in each one. I preface this data with the caveat that the figures
included are estimates and at times vary significantly across sources. As noted earlier,
there is no comprehensive database to draw quantitative data from, leaving no alternative
to using such estimates.
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Table One: Estimates of Female Integration by Group
SOURCES: See Footnotes.
Group Name
LTTE

Chechen Separatists

PKK
EPLF
Mau Mau
FRELIMO
FARC
Red Brigades
RAF

Estimated Female Integration
Cook suggests that approximately 30% of the LTTE’s membership have been female and
maintains that Tamil women have carried out approximately one-third of its suicide
bombings.213
Pape, O’Rourke, and McDermit state that while the majority of Chechen suicide bombers
are male, a substantial fraction (over 40%) are female.214
Cragin and Daly assert that the PKK utilizes 1,100 female operatives out of 5,000 total
(22%),”215 while Lowe estimates that 40% of PKK fighters are female.216
Connel states that by 1991, approximately one third of EPLF’s membership (and 13% of
its frontline fighters) were female.217
Lewis points out that women only made up 5% of the guerilla army.”218
Gonzalez-Perez argues that females in FRELIMO only served in supportive roles, not
operative ones.219
Levels of female integration in FARC vary widely, with Dorst putting female membership
at 30-35%, 220 while Stanski estimates it at 40%.221
Cook maintains that at least 30% of the Red Brigades’ membership was female, with the
percentage of female leaders possibly higher.222
Gonzalez-Perez states that approximately 33-50% of the RAF’s membership was female.
223
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Chart One: Estimated Female Membership in Terrorist Groups (%)
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SOURCES: See footnotes.
Findings
Broadly speaking, my research question asked why some terrorist groups have
significant female membership while others do not. I hypothesized that the nature of the
group in question would be linked to its degree of unity and that this in turn would be a
major determinant of female integration.
As a result of my analysis, I found support for parts of my hypothesis, but not for
others. For example, my prediction that Ethno-Nationalist groups would be the most
unified type of terrorist group was borne out by the evidence. Such groups often share an
objective, enemy, and identity that I argued would unify them more than other terrorist
organizations. My analysis indicated, though, that Revolutionary Groups were just as
unified as Ethno-Nationalist ones, and that National Liberation groups were only slightly
less unified.
What this finding suggests to me is that there are far more than three dimensions
that should be evaluated when measuring a group’s level of unity. Though scholarship
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maintains a relationship between group ideology and female integration, for example, I
believe there is a need for more research that specifies how significant that relationship
is. Variables such as group size, location, and environment were all factors that this
research project did not address, and I would be curious to examine if any of them
influence levels of female integration in a terrorist group.
Finally, as I reflect on my own research, I consider the possibility that, in fact, my
hypothesis should actually be inversed; the more diverse a group is, the more likely they
will be to integrate females and other underrepresented groups of people.
On the question of unity and female integration, I found that, in fact, there seems
to be little or no definitive correlation between the two; unified groups integrated females
and so did those that were less unified. In realizing this, I am left to suggest other
independent variables that may prove more influencing in determining female integration
than group unity. The available scholarship on female terrorism already suggests that
there has been an ideological inclination for leftist organizations to integrate females
more quickly than conservative ones, but this is a trend that has changed within the last
decade as specifically Islamic terrorist groups have risen to prominence within the last 15
years. 224 I believe evaluation of changing terrorist group ideologies must be at the
forefront in the analysis of females’ integration into these groups, as scholarship has
implied a clear relationship between the two.
In evaluating the my case study selection, I note that the nine terrorist groups I
examined varied in size, lifespan, and environment. Though a research project analyzing
more similar terrorist groups would have merit, I acknowledge the difficulty in
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identifying a large number of terrorist groups with highly comparable backgrounds. What
I would suggest is a more in-depth analysis of each type of group that drew from a larger
pool of groups. For example, widening the scope and examining nine Ethno-Nationalist
groups more comprehensively may produce better results than the comparative
examination I selected to undertake in my research.
One thing that makes any sort of research on the topic extremely challenging is
the lack of any reliable, comprehensive quantitative data on female membership in
violent groups. This leaves researchers in the difficult position of relying on qualitative,
descriptive accounts that often provide wildly different estimates of female integration.
Conclusion
My research question grew out of a general consensus among scholars of female
terrorism that it is an underdeveloped field with a critical need for growth. My research
contributes to that growth, though substantial work remains. The cultivation of interdisciplinary research to examine female terrorism is essential to ensuring progress.
Additionally, a concerted effort to either create or expand current databases on female
terrorists would significantly increase our ability to carry out comprehensive and
comparative analyses of them.
The recent increase in literature on female terrorists could not be timelier as their
direct impact on the wider phenomenon of terrorism becomes more prevalent. According
to Sutten, the presence female terrorists in both leadership and operational roles has
increased globally and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.225

Marne L. Sutten, “The Rising Importance of Women in Terrorism and the Need to Reform
Counterterrorism Strategy,” (April 2009), 7.
225
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There are clear advantages to furthered research of female terrorists in both
academic and policy terms. As to the former, we can assume that any investigation into
an under-studied area such as female participation in violent movements will contribute
directly to our broader understanding of terrorism as whole. As to the latter, scholars have
increasingly suggested that a fuller understanding of female terrorists is crucial to the
development of effective counterterrorism policies. Says, Nacos: “Gender reality must
inform the measures designed to prevent and respond to terrorism and perhaps more
importantly, the implementation of anti- and counterterrorism policies.”226
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